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POLYCENTRISM AND FLUX IN SPATIALIZED 
MANAGEMENT: EVIDENCE FROM MAINE’S 
LOBSTER (HOMARUS AMERICANUS) FISHERY
Jennifer F. Brewer
ABSTRACT
Spatial approaches to fisheries management hold great promise but require 
continued conceptual and policy development. Polycentrism and flux emerge 
as useful concepts, drawing lessons from more customary, informal resource-
use patterns to produce more innovative “spatialized” policies within existing 
governance architectures. Empirical evidence from Maine shows that pioneering 
efforts have been limited by the single-species focus of conventional management 
hierarchies. As entry limits have consolidated the fishing fleet and eliminated 
flexible, diversified, and adaptive business strategies, cross-species and habitat 
externalities have become problematic. State lobster (Homarus americanus Milne-
Edwards, 1837) comanagement zones have achieved some successes, including trap 
limits and improved industry-management communications, but incur significant 
transaction costs and raise equity and stewardship concerns. Kindred proposals for 
spatial refinement of groundfish management and locally based area-management 
councils lack support from the state Department of Marine Resources, Atlantic 
States Marine Fisheries Commission, New England Fishery Management Council, 
and National Marine Fisheries Service. Broader and more transparent deliberation 
of explicitly spatial and ecosystem approaches might be advanced by citizen 
panels convened to foster polycentric decision structures and accommodate more 
integrative management strategies.
Interest in explicitly spatial approaches to marine policy has increased in recent 
years (Crowder et al., 2006; Ehler and Douvere, 2007; Young et al., 2007; Douvere and 
Ehler, 2008). “Spatialized” frameworks have been initiated in European and Austra-
lian ocean policy contexts, and states such as California, Oregon, Massachusetts, and 
Rhode Island are following suit. Nonetheless, practical implementation proves more 
difficult in many cases. As linked policy and scientific discussions continue in this 
direction, fisheries present acute socioecological challenges. The fluidity and physi-
cal extent of marine environments, and related limitations to human observation of 
behaviors and distributions of marine organisms and harvesters, make difficult the 
establishment of fixed and discrete boundaries that might withstand the multiple re-
source-access claims and decision horizons of a diverse public. Competing pressures 
on marine space increase with new demands for sustainable energy, transportation, 
biotic and abiotic resources, leisure activities, and environmental conservation. Bio-
oceanographic changes will probably accelerate because of entropy in the planetary 
climate system, despite the most valiant efforts to mitigate anthropogenous climate 
drivers. Correspondingly, fishing practices manifest strategic and adaptive choices 
across space, species, gear, markets, and capital and labor investments. Only signifi-
cant policy innovation can cope with flux, movement, and shifting public priorities 
in closely coupled human-marine systems. Spatial approaches offer real benefits, but 
their ultimate effectiveness will require more thought, nuance and refinement than 
they have received thus far. In particular, existing governmental structures may not 
have sufficient adaptive capacity to monitor or regulate more localized attributes 
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of biophysical and social boundaries in marine environments. Here, I offer, among 
many possible avenues for the conceptual development of more spatialized fisheries 
management, polycentric governance and contingent boundaries as useful design 
concepts.
As many sciences continue to sift through the achievements and disappointments 
of mid-20th century quantitative revolutions, inconvenient empirical observations 
confound our most abstract reductions of spatial and temporal phenomena. Among 
other legacies, Cartesian confidence that spatial statistics can thoroughly explain 
human-environment relationships make way for poststructuralist reminders that 
everything is “place-based.” Less loudly announced but nonetheless implicit in this 
geographic turn, attributes of specific places are necessarily understood as being 
specific in time. Obvious though these insights may seem, they have yet to pervade 
the practice of fisheries management and policy. Congressional reauthorization of 
the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (FCMA) in 2006 did little to dis-
lodge the legal primacy of large-scale single-species yield models, despite widespread 
scientific recognition that tools better honed for spatial and temporal precision are 
needed (NRC, 1998; Wilson et al., 1999; Hilborn et al., 2005; Young et al., 2007).
Compelling arguments have been made that more spatialized marine resource 
management can provide increased protection to marine habitat and species, reduce 
conflicts among groups, improve coordination among agencies, and increase stew-
ardship incentives among users (Wilson et al., 1999; Crowder et al., 2006; Young et 
al., 2007; Douvere and Ehler, 2008). Some of these authors also point to the need 
for cross-scalar institutional mechanisms, but none explicitly suggests that cross-
scalar governance ought to accommodate not only the hierarchically nested jurisdic-
tions typical of modern nation states but also polycentric governance modes—and 
the latter are difficult to envision and implement without ceding greater intellectual 
ground to stochastic models of socioecological systems. Similarly, few authors grap-
ple with the virtual inevitability of social and ecological flux across even the most 
carefully assigned boundaries, perhaps because doing so immediately deflates our 
collective confidence in solving a multitude of marine policy challenges with tidy 
mapping exercises. As discussed below, these concepts of polycentrism and flux may 
prove useful in the struggle to overcome excessive transaction costs and governance 
dysfunction in fisheries management, spatialized or otherwise. Insightful theoretical 
precedent and concrete examples are found in political theory, geography, ecology, 
and interdisciplinary literatures. Evidence from Maine’s lobster (Homarus america-
nus Milne-Edwards, 1837) fishery encourages us to consider more specific benefits 
and challenges of practical implementation. Although this and other fisheries could 
benefit from more thoughtful management attention to spatially specific phenom-
ena, meaningful regulatory progress in this direction also requires new mechanisms 
for analysis and deliberation across socioecological variables that are thus far over-
looked in formal management.
Polycentrism and Flux
Polycentric governance as a theoretical construct differs somewhat from prevail-
ing understandings of hierarchy theory (Ostrom et al., 1961; Simon, 1962; Gunderson 
and Holling, 2002; Hooghe and Marks, 2003; Rocheleau and Roth, 2007; Pahl-Wostl 
et al., 2008). As in dynamic hierarchical systems, polycentric interunit relationship 
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may be independent or interdependent, informal interactions can be as important as 
formal ones, and cooperative and competitive feedback loops intersect. Rather than a 
neatly nested and discrete array of organizational units, however, polycentrism envi-
sions less orderly networks of governing bodies with partly overlapping jurisdictions. 
Formal and informal attributes such as group membership or spatiotemporal extent 
may be incongruent. Polycentric governance institutions are less permanent; they 
may arise, reform, or dissolve in response to functional needs and do not offer the 
same breadth of goods or services provided by conventionally hierarchical jurisdic-
tions such as municipalities, states, provinces, or nations. Polycentrism’s particular 
relevance to the present discussion is that it permits more flexible and opportunistic 
institutional design, more mutable boundaries, and less fixed and exclusive loyalties 
among members. It may even encourage policy entrepreneurship through the pros-
pect of competing providers of ecosystem goods and services (Hooghe and Marks, 
2003). In the present era, polycentric governance is unlikely to maintain complete in-
dependence from hierarchical arrangements, because nation states provide essential 
legal, monetary, and physical resources. Nonetheless, some scholars point to more 
autonomous examples in alliances of corporations and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, Swiss cantons, the European Union, and the high seas (Ruggie, 1993; Rosenau, 
1997; Frey and Eichenberger, 1999; Steinberg, 2001; Hooghe and Marks, 2003).
Concepts of flux are prominent in hierarchy theory, often referring to informa-
tion passed up and down scalar levels of organization (Simon, 1962; Gunderson and 
Holling, 2002; Walker et al., 2006). My discussion here considers flux as movement 
and influence across socioecological boundaries, such that the boundaries must be 
recognized as contingent, flexible, or fuzzy. Boundaries may be contingent in both 
spatial and temporal terms in that they move over time, become more or less perme-
able over time, are more porous in some physical locations than in others, and are 
more easily transgressed by some people or things than others. This phenomenon 
is well documented in geographic studies of international borders and territories, 
where borderland residents may play one governmental authority against another, 
selectively mobilize territorial identities and governmental processes to leverage lo-
cal natural resource access, or continually revise cultural conceptions of “us” and 
“them” (Sahlins, 1989; Newman and Paasi, 1998). International-relations scholar 
John Ruggie asserts further that the norm of discrete and exclusive territories is 
an evolutionary anomaly, specific to the episteme, or rationality, of modernity, and 
therefore vulnerable to fundamental transformation in the postmodern era (Ruggie, 
1993). Indeed, urban mixed-use neighborhoods and medieval, kin-focused, peasant, 
indigenous, and nomadic societies provide numerous examples where livelihoods, 
social relationships, migration patterns, and historical precedent often trump ter-
ritorial claims (Jacobs, 1961; Bruce et al, 1993; Ruggie, 1993; Scott, 1998; Steinberg, 
2001; Mol and Law, 2005).
Although some observers might assume that polycentrism and flexible boundaries 
are less able to internalize externalities, accounting for externalities often depends 
on the temporal and spatial units of analysis and rarely takes into account costs 
across formal and informal organizational units such as business firms, government 
offices, and broader social structures (Commons, 1934; Granovetter, 1985; Acheson, 
1994). In particular, fluctuating transaction costs of monitoring, enforcement, and 
institutional reform are often overlooked in comparison to static costs of initial es-
tablishment and routine adjustments.
BULLETIN OF MARINE SCIENCE, VOL. 86, NO. 2, 2010290
Although they generally use different terminology, geographers and anthropol-
ogists in the shared subfield of political ecology point out the unpredictability of 
interactions between polycentric and hierarchical structures in natural-resource 
management (Rocheleau and Roth, 2007). They particularly emphasize the preva-
lence of polycentric structures within informal resource-management regimes, where 
subgroups differentiated by class, age, gender, ethnicity, or other factors perpetu-
ate different patterns and norms of resource use and resource user group bounding. 
They frequently stress the movement of material, financial, and human resources; 
ideologies; practices; and policies across scales and boundaries of human-environ-
ment systems, whether these bounds be analytical, physical, or social, and despite 
the inherent methodological challenges of such studies. This evidence underscores 
the need to assess resource management regimes not only from the perspective of 
administrative functionaries but with close attention to material manifestations vis-
ible at the local level. For example, a founding treatise in political ecology articulated 
causal chains through which political and economic marginalization can worsen 
environmental degradation by shortening decision horizons and eroding norms of 
resource stewardship (Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). By way of contrast, analyses 
bounded by conventionally ecological or economic parameters are unlikely to reveal 
such socioecological feedbacks. Another study observed that fences surrounding for-
mally declared parklands can make poachers of local residents who breach them to 
pursue longstanding subsistence and religious practices (Bruce et al., 1993). Such a 
mismatch between more static legal tenure categories and more fluid preexisting 
customary systems can escalate social tensions, raise transaction costs, and reduce 
conservation incentives. A somewhat later paper reported that petty corruption can 
significantly reroute the localized impacts of government policies for natural re-
source management (Robbins, 2000), reminding us that not only resource users but 
also government officials have multiple and conflicting loyalties. Yet another noted 
that, as resource-dependent peasant communities ally with environmental groups to 
oppose industrial enclosures of local resources, multinational industry groups co-
alesce to rebut with global public-relations campaigns (Stonich, 2000). Clearly, these 
informal networks built across sub- and supragovernmental scales can challenge for-
mal governmental efforts. 
In all these examples, different groups claim legitimacy through different moral 
authorities and sources of political power. Resource-use conflicts arise or intensify 
and the transaction costs of conservation efforts escalate when governance fails to 
accommodate diverse livelihood strategies, patterns of resource access, and concep-
tions of appropriate decision processes. Whether rigid or flexible, social and bio-
physical boundaries require maintenance and monitoring, raising questions about 
who will be responsible for these activities and to whom they will be accountable. 
In more metatheoretical terms, when hierarchical institutions neglect polycentrism 
and flux across material, social, and discursive domains, policy outcomes become 
less certain. In this vein, management of Maine’s lobster fishery provides an instruc-
tive example of differences between polycentric and hierarchical architectures in 
marine governance and of the significance of flux across contingent socioecological 
boundaries.
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Learning from the Maine Lobster
The set of data informing the present analysis includes more than 200 interviews 
and informal conversations with more than 150 fishing-industry members and more 
than 70 fisheries professionals and scientists; more than 80 randomized surveys 
completed by Maine fishermen; participant observation in fishing households, on 
working waterfronts, at professional and scientific meetings, aboard fishing boats, 
and at more than 35 public meetings; and review of relevant textual sources in print-
ed and electronic formats. These activities took place over the last decade, mostly in 
Maine but also in Massachusetts, Washington, D.C., Alaska, and other locations in 
the United States and other countries.
Informal Practices
As Jim Acheson (1988) documented two decades ago, entry to Maine’s lobster 
fishery has long been governed informally by harbor- and kin-based groups. Also 
noted but more rapidly forgotten was that, until late in the last century, many if 
not most lobstermen also participated in other coastal fisheries, such as those for 
groundfish—which often include cod (Gadus morhua Linnaeus, 1758), haddock 
[Melanogrammus aeglefinus (Linnaeus, 1758)], winter flounder [Pseudopleuronectes 
americanus (Walbaum, 1792)], American plaice [dab, Hippoglossoides platessoides 
(Fabricius, 1780)], witch flounder [grey sole, Glyptocephalus cynoglossus (Linnaeus, 
1758)], saithe [Atlantic pollock, Pollachius virens (Linnaeus, 1758)], silver hake 
[whiting, Merluccius bilinearis (Mitchill, 1814)], red hake [Urophycis chuss (Walbaum, 
1792)], and Acadian redfish (Sebastes fasciatus Storer, 1854)—or for northern bluefin 
tuna [Thunnus thynnus (Linnaeus, 1758)], shrimp (Pandalus borealis Krøyer, 1838), 
scallops [Placopecten magellanicus (Gmelin, 1791)], herring (Clupea harengus 
harengus Linnaeus, 1758), Atlantic medhaden [pogy, Brevoortia tyrannus (Latrobe, 
1802)], Jonah and rock crabs (Cancer borealis Stimpson, 1859, and Cancer irroratus 
Say, 1817), or, eventually, urchins [Strongylocentrotus droebachiensis (Müller, 1776)] 
(Wilson, 1982; Acheson, 1988). As detailed in field interviews, the decision of which 
species to fish was determined by species availability, market prices, labor and 
capital resources, and the willingness of other fishermen to share local ecological 
knowledge. Whereas close family members were virtually guaranteed entry, the 
decision to support or tolerate fishing entry by neighbors or more distant kin was 
made entirely outside the legal system, permitting fishing-reliant communities to 
adapt to changing social and ecological conditions. When fishing effort was deemed 
excessive, fewer new entrants were permitted. When new entrants might be useful to 
maintain markets, fishing areas, labor pools, local economies, or needy households, 
entry could be granted more generously. Certainly the system was not without flaws, 
such as the ability of some families or groups to consolidate decision influence 
through violence, but broad deliberations and protracted negotiations involving a 
number of local residents were often possible. Such conversations could take place 
on the water, at the shore, around town, and in households where the perspectives 
of other family members might be considered. Local youth generally built up their 
business and expertise by hand hauling a few cast-off lobster traps from a small 
rowed skiff. Some new adult entrants could work their way in by settling in town, 
crewing, and biding their time while generally ingratiating themselves. In this way, 
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each fishery and each fishing group represented one of many in a flexibly bounded 
and overlapping pattern of polycentric decision making. The fishing industry was 
notorious for its disinterest in most aspects of legal regulation, except for widespread 
adherence to laws protecting young and broodstock lobsters, which gained popularity 
after a lobster population crash in the first part of the 20th century (Acheson, 1988, 
2004). Until the 1990s, these laws were debated and set by the state legislature, after 
public hearings and informal conversations between elected representatives and any 
interested constituents.
Field observation reveals that, in addition to these movements of individuals across 
the social boundaries of fishing communities, spatial arrangements in the lobster 
fishery have also exhibited flux. The lobster-trap setting grounds of each harbor or 
group have spatial boundaries, “invisible lines,” that are constantly contested and 
negotiated. When unfamiliar or unwelcome traps appear at the perimeter of an area, 
they might or might not be forcibly removed. Owners of offending traps might be 
warned off initially with knots or opened trap doors. Sometimes persistent intrusion 
will result in lost traps or more costly retaliation, but sometimes a game of lower 
stakes tit-for-tat ensues for a short or lengthy period. New traps might be tolerated 
on bottom of less immediate or general interest, or after a reciprocity agreement 
in which access is traded for another piece of bottom. Once new traps are in place 
for some time, they are considered to be more established by both area newcomers 
and those with longer-term spatial claims. Similarly, in the past lobster catchers and 
groundfish draggers would often agree to allocate some bottom for exclusive trap-
ping or dragging, to avoid costly accidental damage to both sets of gear and the pos-
sibility of precipitating intentional gear damage in retaliation or to expand bottom 
claims. These customary practices allowed integrated monitoring and maintenance 
of social and biophysical boundaries and frequent consideration of proposed bound-
ary adjustments.
Today, these informal norms of polycentrism and contingent boundaries still ex-
ist to some extent. Randomized surveys indicate that the majority of Maine fish-
ermen have participated in more than one fishery in their lifetimes, some having 
participated in more than 10 (see Table 1). Most harbors’ trap-setting areas are now 
expanding and less strongly defended, but most boundaries continue to shift even 
as some coalesce (Acheson and Brewer, 2003; Acheson, 2004). As conveyed by the 
literatures reviewed above, such polycentric and flexibly bounded patterns are often 
characteristic of informal, or extralegal, governance and resource management. As 
long as markets, technology, and capital were limited, informal management was 
relatively effective, with some assistance from the state legislature (Acheson, 2004). 
As described below, however, an enveloping cascade of legal and regulatory events 
occurred during the late 20th century, imposing a more hierarchical management 
architecture and drawing more rigid boundaries. This shift toward a more fixed and 
exclusionary policy framework was first resisted by both local harvesters and state 
officials. Nonetheless, a gradual transformation increased state compliance with 
federal administrative pressures, reduced the ecological and social adaptiveness of 
the fishery, and produced limited gains in resource conservation. Several antecedent 
drivers of this change sequence can be traced to Maine’s groundfishery.
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Regulatory Context
Passage of the FCMA in 1976 not only expelled foreign fishing vessels from the 
newly declared Exclusive Economic Zone but created loans for larger boats and gear. 
Previously, most Mainers caught groundfish with tub trawls and a few gillnets, nei-
ther of which require large boats or heavily damage benthic habitat. As reported by 
many experienced fishermen, new investments in heavy otter trawls and roller gear 
exposed previously unfished bottom to intensive fishing effort and habitat degrada-
tion. As groundfish populations declined, a landmark lawsuit by the Conservation 
Law Foundation and Massachusetts Audubon Society in 1991, amendments to the 
FCMA in 1996, and subsequent challenges from environmental groups increased 
the intensity of National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) over-
sight in groundfish and other fisheries through the National Marine Fisheries Ser-
vice (NMFS). The New England Fishery Management Council (NEFMC), originally 
created by the FCMA as one of eight regional councils to help expand the domestic 
fleet, responded by limiting new groundfish permits and limiting each permit’s an-
nual fishing days, often favoring permit holders with the most dedicated groundfish 
histories and pushing many fishermen with more flexible strategies into dedicated 
lobstering, which was still open to new entrants. Other fisheries managed by the 
NEFMC or Maine Department of Marine Resources (DMR) became subject to simi-
lar entry limits, gradually boxing each fisherman into fewer and fewer species and 
creating political and social identities more focused on single fisheries and less inter-
ested in cross-species dynamics or the overall balance of the ecosystem.
Although many entry-limit decisions were certainly triggered by stock depletions, 
some were disproportionately influenced by a small number of fishing firms, espe-
cially a handful of more specialized and capitalized boat owners who could afford the 
shore time to protect their fishery access through NEFMC lobbying and participa-
tion. For example, field interviews and archival data confirm that when an environ-
mental lawsuit forced the NEFMC to make dramatic cuts to aggregate groundfishing 
days at sea in 2002, three of the six landings years selected retroactively as days at sea 
qualification criteria were years with long and/or profitable winter shrimping sea-
sons (1996–1998), during which many diversified boats had abbreviated or skipped 
their usual spring groundfish rotation. Many of those boat owners were then granted 
fewer groundfishing days than owners who had continued to concentrate on de-
pleted groundfish species. The regulatory decision ignored common understanding 
that shrimp populations and prices fluctuate dramatically with oceanographic and 
economic drivers mostly unrelated to local fishing effort; can only sustain a seasonal 
Table 1. Number of fisheries participated in by individual Maine commercial fishermen. n, number 
of fishermen surveyed.
Survey group n Mean no. fisheries SD Time period Survey year
Maine commercial marine 
harvest license holders
12 4.0 3.2 lifetime 2003
Maine commercial lobster 
harvest license holders




16 2.7 1.4 first fishery, 1983, 1993, 2003 2005
BULLETIN OF MARINE SCIENCE, VOL. 86, NO. 2, 2010294
and diversified fishery; and can be helpful in diverting fishing effort away from over-
fished species (Clark et al., 2000). Many small diversified boats had also suspended 
their groundfish rotation during qualification years because of temporary inshore 
gillnet bans designed to protect harbor porpoises (Phocoena phocoena Linnaeus, 
1758). Trawlers had been allowed to continue fishing those waters, however, thereby 
limiting incidental gains for groundfish stock conservation. Although the NEFMC 
has also implemented some coarsely defined groundfish spawning-area closures in-
shore, industry members and community-based nongovernmental organizations re-
questing stronger and more empirically supportable protection of inshore spawning 
habitats have been repeatedly rebuffed by NEFMC members and staff, often on the 
grounds that any resulting conservation gains would not be recognized by federal 
stock-assessment models. Notably, those models are constructed to assess species 
populations on the spatial scale of the Gulf of Maine. They assume that the existing 
time series of species population data incorporates sufficient spatiotemporal varia-
tion in factors such as benthic habitat structure, fishing technologies, fish migration 
and spawning behaviors, water temperature and other oceanographic phenomena, 
and other possible impacts on target species populations that are difficult to quantify 
(Wilson et al, 1999; Ames, 2004). Adding insult to injury, continued fleet reductions 
have not sufficiently restored groundfish populations. Now-excluded fishermen in-
creasingly call for more spatialized and ecosystem-based approaches, as evidenced 
by letters submitted to the NEFMC in 2006.
Although most groundfishermen started their careers on small lobster boats, those 
who found themselves regulated out of groundfishing and refocused primarily on 
lobstering had acquired larger boats, more willingness or ability to take on debt, and 
more ambitious business plans. This trend accelerated a general increase in lobster-
boat sizes, trap numbers, trap setting areas, and profit expectations. Effort especially 
increased offshore on larger broodstock lobsters, which play a disproportionate role 
in replenishing heavily fished inshore populations. Former groundfishermen, more 
prepared for deep water and less prepared to defend claims to inshore customary 
trap-setting areas, were among those who pioneered the offshore effort increase.
Most Maine fishermen opposed legal entry limits in the past. At least through 
1978, more than two thirds of groundfish and herring-boat captains opposed them, 
and even supporters were very concerned with the possibility of excluding young 
people or restricting interspecies livelihood strategies (Acheson, 1980). On one large 
and cooperatively run lobster wharf in 1989, a well established fishing family mem-
ber alerted friends and neighbors to a proposal to limit lobster fishery entry but re-
ceived blank stares and dismissive comments from fishermen who apparently found 
the proposal incomprehensible or unworthy of discussion. As late as 2004 in a highly 
fishing-dependent eastern Maine town, interview data documented that the vast ma-
jority of residents vigorously opposed entry limits for any fishery. Crew, often hoping 
to have their own boats and licenses in the future, generally express stronger opposi-
tion, even in harbors with more entry-limit supporters.
Partly for these reasons, the state of Maine and its fishing industry have frequently 
opposed NEFMC and NMFS policies, including fleet consolidation, and assumptions 
in many federal impact assessments that fished stocks, habitats, and fishing commu-
nities are homogeneous across large areas. Some of these conflicts between state and 
federal policies were partially resolved by reduction of NOAA’s direct management 
oversight of lobster and other species. In 1995 the Atlantic States Marine Fisheries 
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Commission (ASMFC) was given a more central role as an interstate compact, leav-
ing some regulatory discretion to individual states through provisions for conser-
vation equivalencies. Nonetheless, NOAA began pressuring ASMFC to implement 
lobster-trap limits in the Gulf of Maine and perhaps entry limits or other fleet-con-
solidation mechanisms.
Zone Comanagement
Because lobstermen in different parts of the Maine coast had developed different 
fishing-effort levels and trap-limit preferences to accommodate local socioecologi-
cal conditions, and because DMR leadership wished the industry to assume greater 
responsibility for comanagement, in 1995 DMR convinced the state legislature to 
create seven lobster zones along the state coastline, incorporating input from a few 
lobstermen, and dividing each zone into several district subunits. DMR then de-
veloped administrative procedures for zone referenda and elected representation, 
granting voting rights to lobster license holders (Acheson, 2004). Different trap 
limits could now be established in different parts of the state, placating NOAA and 
ASMFC while allowing the industry to adjust the rules to local needs and norms. An-
other, less-publicized intent, occasionally noted in more private conversations with 
comanagement advocates in academia and DMR, was to use the lobster zones as a 
foundation from which to build a more participatory and ecosystem-based manage-
ment regime, permitting greater cross-species flexibility and greater consideration 
of habitat and social variables. Nonetheless, the immediate intent of DMR leadership 
was for the zone lines merely to delineate voting groups, not to restrict the spatial 
extent of individual trap-setting areas.
After the zones passed trap limits, however, regulatory enforcement where adja-
cent zone trap limits differed required monitoring of zone lines and trap locations 
by state marine patrol officers. Interviews reveal that some license holders cited the 
new zone boundaries to assert fishing rights in waters beyond those fished by their 
traditional harbor group but within their home zone. Others interpreted the zone 
boundaries to mean that they were now authorized to exclude traps intruding from 
adjoining zones, even if they belonged to lobstermen who had fished those same wa-
ters in the past. The increasing availability of cheap electronics for geographic po-
sitioning made it easier for fishermen to learn unknown bottom without assistance 
from older peers. Violent and legal disputes arose around several boundaries, requir-
ing DMR to invest in professional mediation, legal representation, and the creation 
of buffer areas at some zone boundaries (Acheson and Brewer, 2003; Acheson, 2004). 
Whereas informal fishing areas were constantly negotiated, the zones lines are fixed 
in law. DMR also increased penalties for trap cutting, decreasing the industry’s abil-
ity to impose extralegal sanctions on unwanted individuals and actions. Whereas a 
few lobstermen had to reduce their trap numbers to comply with trap limits, others 
increased their traps because they could now compete more easily with the most 
ambitious fishermen.
Newly empowered by zone voting rights and fixed spatial claims, and now exclud-
ed from most other fisheries, some lobstermen successfully lobbied the legislature for 
additional legal power to restrict entry by voting on ratios of exit to entry. Despite ini-
tial refusals by DMR to approve very restrictive exit-to-entry ratios, in five zones a se-
ries of increasingly exclusionary votes established ratios issuing only one new license 
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for each five licenses not renewed. In one zone one license is issued for each three 
licenses not renewed, and one zone still remains open to new entrants. Waiting lists 
have become years long, and a 2008 DMR survey found half of lobster license holders 
to be supportive of a statewide license freeze. Although all zones still allow 18-year-
olds with 3 yrs of lobstering experience to circumvent waiting lists and obtain full 
licenses, most have seriously debated repealing that provision. As one member of a 
multigenerational fishing family and staunch entry-limit opponent said, “There were 
always a few people who wanted [entry limits]. But until there was a receptive gov-
ernment, it didn’t go anywhere. It was like looking at a girlie magazine. These things 
can be incremental. Then one day you go in and everyone has a girlie magazine on 
their desk and you say ‘okay’” (anonymous source, 1999). Although many observers 
and current lobster-license holders uphold entry limits as necessary for fishery con-
servation and economic profits, many members of would-be fishing households be-
lieve their permanent exclusion to be profoundly unjust, observing before the global 
economic recession that some lobstermen fishing the most productive areas were 
raking in annual profits exceeding $200,000. Although the specter of overfishing is 
frequently cited by industry, management, and academic observers as the necessitat-
ing driver for entry limits, the particular choice of a stringent entry limit mechanism 
instead of more spatioecologically nuanced options such as gear restrictions or area 
protections has been made likely by the relative ease with which fleet reduction and 
specialization mechanisms satisfy federal effort-reduction mandates. Conservation 
arguments for entry limits have been quietly undermined as state and academic fish-
eries scientists and lobster harvesters have repeatedly contested longstanding federal 
declarations that the lobster populations is overfished (Steneck, 2006).
Archival and interview sources confirm that legal entry limits also overtook a slow-
er-moving DMR plan to establish a formal lobster-fishery apprenticeship, which was 
to mimic the flexibility and social breadth of traditional entry practices by requiring 
new license holders to invest two years as crew and acquire management-relevant 
knowledge and skills through an organized education program. The education pro-
gram was never implemented, and the few individuals completing apprenticeships 
now find they must wait some years longer for a license. Whereas apprenticeship was 
intended to establish more socially mediated and contingent barriers to entry, zone-
entry ratios grant current license holders legal exclusion rights and foster a sense of 
entitlement and enclosure. In areas where the few remaining groundfishermen still 
operate, trap-versus-drag gear conflicts have escalated, because so few fishermen can 
now participate in both fisheries, and most view one another as competitors instead 
of allies. Knowing that cod prey on lobster, most lobstermen finding cod in their 
traps now spear them for bait, although a few who still hope to groundfish some day 
release them alive to reproduce. In contrast, those most interested in the future of 
groundfishing, even low-volume hook fishing, are often inspired to note and discuss 
the spatial and habitat patterns of accidentally trapped cod, just as they routinely 
track lobster migrations and habits to maximize yields per trap haul. Although lob-
stermen routinely observe and memorize the movements and behavior of lobsters 
across local bottom, adjusting trap setting strategies to maximize per trap hauls over 
time, no zones have seriously discussed the possibility of area closures, even as catch-
es and populations have declined from all time highs in 2006 and 2002 (Correia et 
al., 2005). Even longstanding arguments for seasonal closures during molting season, 
when recently molted lobsters are difficult to market, have gained little traction.
BREWER: POLYCENTRISM AND FLUX IN MAINE LOBSTER MANAGEMENT 297
Whereas zone districts were originally envisioned as a site of local comanagement 
participation and engagement, they now operate primarily to elect zone representa-
tives. Because voting on exit-to-entry ratios, trap limits, and other key issues occurs 
through mail-in referenda, collective discussion is often limited and is unlikely to 
include non–license holders such as crew, family members, or other fishing-related 
businesses. Without the repeated kitchen-table and pickup-truck conversations that 
were required to mobilize informal agreements to include or exclude fishing activi-
ties by kin and neighbors, active consideration of ethical responsibilities and public 
welfare at the community level is diminished. Voting requires significant oversight 
and administration by DMR staff, who also provide secretarial and advisory support 
at each zone meeting and ensure that zone procedures are codified to withstand legal 
scrutiny from both industry members and environmental groups. The zones have 
also been fortunate enough to inherit relatively healthy lobster populations (Steneck, 
2006). Their response during a period of dramatic resource decline remains to be 
seen. The possibility of widespread disease or mortality caused by rising water tem-
peratures like those in Long Island Sound and southern New England remains a 
lurking worry.
Expansion of more spatialized comanagement to other Gulf of Maine fisheries has 
been slow. The time required of industry members who become actively involved 
in comanagement rule making for a single fishery is significant. Active comanage-
ment participation in more than one fishery is virtually impossible without reduction 
of fishing time. Although DMR recognizes the importance of the lobster zones in 
improving communications between the industry and the agency, most other state-
managed fisheries bring lower prices, fish depleted populations, attract less public 
attention as statewide icons, and are less politically powerful. Repeated grassroots 
requests to permit some decentralization of groundfish management, or at least 
some refinement of the spatial scale at which management occurs, have not gained 
DMR support, partly because of a change in its leadership shortly after the zones 
were created.
Scaling Up?
As noted above, previous DMR leadership once hoped to expand comanagement 
and apprenticeship to other fisheries. Some fishing-industry members and nonprofit 
organizations working with coastal communities have come to share that hope. A 
few express support for the idea of multiple-fishery licensing as a vehicle for ecosys-
tem-based stewardship. Little progress has been made in this direction, however; 
federal policies are a primary impediment. As long as environmental lawsuits and 
NOAA legal defenses focus on the prognoses of relatively aspatial, single-species sta-
tistical models, the advance of substantively spatial and ecosystem-based approaches 
will be difficult. This incongruence between aspatial single-species policies and in-
terest in more place- and ecosystem-based alternatives among some environmental 
and industry groups suggests that structural problems are slowing the transfer of 
information and innovation up and down these scales of human-environment deci-
sion making and are increasing transaction costs to a point at which the NEFMC 
process is scarcely functional. Foundational social-science research tells us that 
government often incurs high transaction costs as a result of bounded rationality, 
imperfect knowledge, opportunism, and other institutional foibles (Acheson, 1994). 
BULLETIN OF MARINE SCIENCE, VOL. 86, NO. 2, 2010298
Regulatory capture by private firms is not uncommon. Less frequently discussed is 
the likelihood that environmental organizations exhibit related limitations and have 
strategic reasons to prefer legal or public-relations battles to less confrontational so-
lutions. Because both NEFMC and judicial routes to fisheries-management reform 
have been mostly unsuccessful in the Gulf of Maine, another option might be to cre-
ate a set of parallel management institutions, reverting to a more hybrid governance 
architecture that incorporates polycentric and hierarchical modes and more flexible 
boundaries to accommodate socioecological and analytical flux such as across fished 
species, fishing group memberships, and species-habitat variables.
For example, one study led by the former DMR commissioner, a pivotal lobster 
comanagement zones advocate, proposed the creation of local multi-interest com-
mittees as area-based governance units, balanced by statewide species committees. 
These would base decisions on multiple ecological parameters, in addition to single-
species stock assessment indicators (Alden and Hayden, 2003). Keeping the history 
of existing regional fishery management councils firmly in mind, however, we might 
consider that government advisory groups, fisheries related or not, are often con-
vened through some process of stakeholder group representation, overlooking the 
reality that most individuals bring a number of internally inconsistent interests to 
the table, that a small group can rarely represent the full breadth of interested groups 
and subgroups, and that such representative designation can sometimes polarize 
and entrench narrow conflicts rather than fostering consensus or policy innovation. 
In this case, the relevant interests run far beyond fishing-license holders to include 
crew, households, shoreside businesses, environmental groups, and many other us-
ers of marine resources. Because the proposed area advisory groups could become 
dominated by narrow fishing interests, and vulnerable to the rigid bounding of fish-
ery-access rights promoted by federal managers and some environmental groups, we 
might further speculate that a parallel institutional mechanism could be given some 
oversight or monitoring role, representing an even broader slate of interests.
Among possible parallel institutions, consensus conferences, citizen panels, and 
citizen juries provide attractive options. These closely related vehicles for public in-
put on policy and regulatory issues were pioneered in the United States by the Na-
tional Institutes of Health but are more widely adopted in northern Europe to address 
technological hazards (Andersen and Jæger, 1999; Gustin, 1999). They gather small 
stratified groups of neutral, disinterested citizens to produce collective policy opin-
ions. Professional staff normally facilitate each group’s acquaintance with relevant 
information and arguments, including scientific opinion. Each group deliberates in a 
nonadversarial and transparent venue with the goal of reaching consensus, or at least 
a well-considered majority vote. In some instances participants are selected from a 
larger prospective pool, as in a courtroom jury. A steering committee is sometimes 
convened to oversee the process.
The scale and terms of such diversified citizen involvement would certainly require 
significant discussion and analysis before implementation, including the articulation 
of relationships across new and existing management structures. It could, however, 
help to complement single-species fish population assessments, which, in our over-
arching system of governmental checks and balances, are often the principal crite-
rion by which individual courtroom judges evaluate agency efforts to juggle disparate 
social interests and comply with federal law. For those skeptics who might argue 
that average citizens are incapable of integrating scientific information into complex 
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rule making, the National Research Council recently released a report concluding 
that public participation, when thoughtfully implemented, can increase the qual-
ity, legitimacy, and capacity of environmental policy (NRC, 2008). As any scientist 
who interacts frequently with the general public will attest, questions from nonex-
perts may not reflect theoretical sophistication but are often quite incisive in their 
ability to seek out weaknesses in our underlying assumptions and extrapolations to 
public policy. Permanent mechanisms for more broadly public oversight could also 
strengthen monitoring and evaluation of the governance process, something often 
advocated but rarely practiced in natural-resource management.
Conclusion
As described above, inflexible hierarchies and boundaries can limit the ecosystem 
potential of spatial fisheries-management decision making. Maine’s lobster fishery 
retains remnants of flexible, polycentric, and adaptive governance, rooted in local, 
customary practices that can accommodate socioecological flux. Fishing firms were 
once diversified across target species and habitats, and informal entry controls and 
fishing area claims were subject to extensive negotiations; in this way, social and 
biophysical boundaries could be carefully monitored and maintained. The federal 
intensification of formalized management imposed new constraints on more local-
ized and integrative resource use strategies, as single-species policies have failed to 
internalize cross-species and habitat externalities. The creation of area-based lob-
ster comanagement zones has achieved some success but has fallen short in other 
respects. NOAA and NEFMC pursuit of legal entry limits and fleet consolidation 
have been replicated at the zone and state levels, ostensibly by channeling of industry 
preferences through the legislature and DMR, but also by a process of elimination, 
as more holistic and ecosystem-cognizant alternatives are now difficult to advance. 
Industry priorities have been realigned from collective to individual concerns, en-
trained within overarching policies of a relatively rigid regulatory hierarchy. More 
spatial, ecosystem-based, and adaptive management innovations have been stalled. 
Broader public participation in area management—including citizen panels or re-
lated mechanisms of enhancing public accountability, informed deliberation, and 
transparent decision processes—might be helpful in loosening this deadlock. With 
thoughtful implementation, these could bring more rigorous and evaluative scru-
tiny to the goals, processes, and knowledge foundations of fisheries decision making 
and might provide avenues for more formal integration of human, cross-species, and 
habitat variables.
As proposals for more spatialized mechanisms for marine resource management 
move forward, whether under the umbrella of marine planning, zoning, protected 
areas, fishing-area closures, or ecosystem-based management, the mixed outcomes 
from the Maine case may be instructive. As in terrestrial resource systems, many 
marine harvester groups exhibit adaptive informal rule making with polycentric gov-
ernance and flexible boundaries that accommodate socioecological flux. These can 
be eroded by rigidly hierarchical policies that encourage discrete bounding of spe-
cies access rights while failing to consider more complex causal relationships among 
social and biophysical variables. 
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